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Abstract
Dark markets are commercial websites that use Bitcoin to sell or broker transactions involving
drugs, weapons, and other illicit goods. Being illegal, they do not offer any user protection, and
several police raids and scams have caused large losses to both customers and vendors over the past
years. However, this uncertainty has not prevented a steady growth of the dark market phenomenon
and a proliferation of new markets. The origin of this resilience have remained unclear so far, also due
to the difficulty of identifying relevant Bitcoin transaction data. Here, we investigate how the dark
market ecosystem re-organises following the disappearance of a market, due to factors including raids
and scams. To do so, we analyse 24 episodes of unexpected market closure through a novel datasets
of 133 million Bitcoin transactions involving 31 dark markets and their users, totalling 4 billion USD.
We show that coordinated user migration from the closed market to coexisting markets guarantees
overall systemic resilience beyond the intrinsic fragility of individual markets. The migration is
swift, efficient and common to all market closures. We find that migrants are on average more active
users in comparison to non-migrants and move preferentially towards the coexisting market with
the highest trading volume. Our findings shed light on the resilience of the dark market ecosystem
and we anticipate that they may inform future research on the self-organisation of emerging online
markets.
Introduction
Dark markets are commercial websites specialised in trading illicit goods. They are accessible via darknets
(e.g., Tor) and vary in specialization, technology, and primary supported language. Silk Road, the first
modern dark market launched in 2011, limited its sales to drugs while other dark markets allow the
trading of weapons, fake IDs and stolen credit cards [1,2]. Most markets facilitate trading between buyers
and vendors of illicit goods, but some of them involve a single vendor only. Regardless of these differences,
Bitcoin is the universally accepted currency, occasionally together with other cryptocurrencies.
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Operating outside of law, dark markets do not offer any protection to customers or vendors. This has
led to the proliferation of scam sales and market hacks. Furthermore, markets may suddenly disappear,
causing significant losses to users. For example, Silk Road was shut down in 2013 by the FBI [3] and in
the same year Sheep Marketplace market was closed by its own administrator, who vanished with 100
million US dollars subtracted to its users [4]. Following these events, markets tried to prevent closure
by deploying technologies such as I2P [5], multisig [6] and rely more often on escrow services [7]. I2P is
an anonymous network layer designed to overcome censorship and multisig enables users to authorise a
transaction through multi signatures. Tumblers (also known as mixers) are services which obscure the
trail back to Bitcoin payments. Escrow services guarantee that markets do not hold users money, instead
a trusted third party holds the money until users confirm they have received the shipment. Despite the
introduction of these measures, market closures continued to occur, both to police seizures and scams.
However, this uncertainty has not prevented a steady growth of both users and revenue of dark
markets. As of today, there are at least 38 active dark markets [8]. The difficulty to identify relevant
transactions from the Bitcoin blockchain has made it hard to quantify market volume [8,10–12] but the
European authorities estimated dark markets drug sales from 2011 to 2015 to be 44 million dollars per
year. A later study estimated that, in early 2016, dark markets drug sales were between 170 million and
300 million dollars per year. [9]. Recently, the market Berlusconi known mostly for selling stolen IDs
was seised by the Italian police who estimated their annual transaction with 2 million euros [2].
The growth and resilience of the dark markets have attracted the attention of the scientific community.
The above mentioned difficulty to identify relevant transactions [8, 10–12] has forced researchers to rely
mostly on data scraped from dark markets websites [11, 13] (but dark markets administrators actively
fight web scraping, seen as a threat), or users surveys [14,15]. Police shutdowns were shown to correlate
with a sudden increase in drug listings in co-existing markets [16, 17], while the most comprehensive
study on closures covered 12 markets concluding ‘that the effect of law enforcement takedowns is mixed
as best’ [11] and a recent analysis of a large 2014 police operation identified an impact of closures on
the drugs’ supply and demand but not the prices [13]. Recent research on how to attribute Bitcoin
anonymised addresses to named entities [18–20] has not been applied yet to investigate the dynamics of
dark markets, and only in few cases identifying dark-market related transactions has been the focus of
research [21].
Here, we investigate the dynamics of 24 market closures by looking at 31 markets in the period
between June 2011 to July 2019. We do so by investigating a novel dataset of Bitcoin transactions
involving dark markets assembled on the basis of the most recent identification methods [22–24]. For
the first time, we quantify the overall activity of the major dark markets, in terms of number of users
and total volume traded. We reveal that the closure of a dark market, due to a police raid or an exit
scam, affects only temporarily the market ecosystem activity, suggesting that dark markets are resilient.
We provide the first systematic investigation of dark market users migration following an unexpected
closure, and show that closures affects mostly low-active users, with highly-active users migrating quickly
to a new market. Finally, we show that migrant users tend to coordinate, with 66% of them choosing
the same new market, which is in most cases the one with largest volume.
Methods
Dark markets operate typically as an eBay for illicit goods where vendors advertise their products and
consumers request the shipment through the website. Transactions flow from buyers to the dark market
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that then sends the money to sellers after buyers confirmation of receiving the goods. Consumers may
leave reviews that contribute to vendors’ reputation [7]. After multiple scam closures, nowadays dark
markets rely often on escrow systems. The dark market does not keep buyers’ bitcoins in local addresses
but instead sends it to an escrow service. After the buyer’s confirmation, the escrow service transfer the
money to the seller.
Our analysis relies on a novel dataset of dark market transactions on the Bitcoin blockchain. The
ledger of Bitcoin transactions (the blockchain) is publicly available and can be retrieved through Bitcoin
core [25] or a third-party API such as Blockchain.com [26]. It consists of the entire list of transaction
records, including time, transferred amount, origin and destination addresses. Addresses are identifiers
of 26− 35 alphanumeric characters that can be generated at no cost by any user of Bitcoin, such that a
single Bitcoin wallet can be associated to multiple addresses. In fact, to ensure privacy and security, most
Bitcoin software and websites help users generate a new address for each transaction. Thus, blockchain
data has to be pre-processed to map groups of addresses to individual users.
We used data pre-processed by Chainalysis following the approach detailed in [22–24]. The pre-
processing relies on state-of-the-art heuristics [18–21, 27], including co-spending clustering, intelligence-
based clustering, behavioural clustering and entity identification through direct interaction [23]. These
techniques rely on the observation of patterns in the Bitcoin protocol transactions and users behaviour.
Chainalysis Identification of addresses related to illicit activities has been relied upon in many law
enforcement investigations [28,29]. Due to this critical use of data, rigorous investigation and avoidance
of false positives is crucial. If an address can not be identified or clustered with certainty the address
will be tagged unnamed. This means that some addresses might belong to a dark market but are not
labelled as one (see more information on our dataset in Appendix 1.1, Figure 9).
We considered the entire transaction data of 31 dark markets (see Appendix 1.1) between June 18th,
2011 and July 24th, 2019. This dataset includes the major markets on the darknet as identified by law
enforcement agencies reports [3, 30] and the World Health Organization [31]. We also considered the
transactions of the users who interacted with one of these markets (dark market’s nearest neighbours)
after their first interaction with a dark market. Thus, each market ecosystem can be represented as an
egocentric network [32] of radius 2, where the market is the central node, its nearest neighbours represent
market users, and direct edges represent transaction occurring either between the market and one of its
neighbours, or between two neighbours. Figure 1 shows a schematic representation of our dataset, where
transactions within the square are the ones included in the dataset. After removing transactions to/from
cryptocurrency exchanges, the dataset contains ∼ 133 million transactions among over 38 million users.
The total number of addresses which directly interacted with dark markets is ∼ 8.3 million. The volume
of transactions sent and received by dark markets addresses amount to ∼ 4.2 billion dollars.
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Figure 1: Dark market ego-network. Our dataset includes transaction between addresses belonging
to a dark market (in red) and its nearest neighbours (in black), as well as the transactions between
nearest neighbours and “other” Bitcoin addresses (in grey). Any transaction between two “other” nodes
is excluded from our dataset. In this schematic representation, the dotted square includes transactions
present in our dataset.
In order to gain information on the analysed markets, we collected additional data from the Gwern
archive on dark markets closures [1]. We also relied on law enforcement documents on closures, and
online forums [30,31,33] dedicated to discussing dark markets to compile comprehensive information (see
Appendix 1.1). Out of the selected markets, 12 performed exit scam, 9 were raided, 3 were voluntarily
closed by their administrators, and 7 are still active. Our dataset includes 2 markets in Russian language,
and the others are in English. Out of the 31 markets, 3 are markets dedicated to fake and stolen IDs
and credit cards. The primary currency on these market is Bitcoin. In Figure 2, we present the lifetime
of the selected markets and the reason behind their closure.
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Figure 2: Dark markets lifetime. Each bar corresponds to a different dark market (see y-axis labels).
Bars are coloured according to the reason behind closure: raided by the police (black), exit scam (dark
blue), voluntary closure (blue). Light blue bars correspond to markets that are still active in November
2019.
Results
After removing transactions to/from cryptocurrency exchanges, the dataset contains 133, 308, 118 trans-
actions among 38, 886, 758 users. The total number of users which directly interacted with dark market
is 8, 377, 478. The volume of transactions sent and received by dark markets addresses amount to 4.210
billion dollars, while the one received by dark markets address is 1.99 USD billion. Table 2 reports
characteristics of the 31 markets considered, including overall number of users and transaction volume.
The most active market in terms of number of users and traded volume is by far AlphaBay, followed by
Hydra.
Market resilience
The capacity of the dark market ecosystem to recover following the closure of a market can be studied
quantifying the evolution of the total volume traded by dark markets in time. Despite recurrent closures,
we find that the number of markets has been relatively stable from 2014 (see Figure 3A). In addition, de-
spite closures, the total weekly volume sent/received by dark market addresses has grown from 2014 until
the end of 2019 (see Figure 3B). In fact, Moving Average Convergence Divergence (MACD) analysis [34]
reveals that, following each dark market closure, the overall dark markets volume drops, but it recovers
quickly after, typically within 9.5 days, see Appendix 1.1. Starting from the end of 2018, however, we
observe a decrease in the total volume traded. It is important to note that, here, we considered the
total volume (in American dollars) sent/received across the entire dark market egocentric network (See
Figure 1).
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Figure 3: Dark markets resilience. (A) The total number of active dark markets across time. (B)
The total volume (in USD) exchanged by dark markets addresses. (C) The number of unique users
interacting with dark markets. Dashed lines represent market closure due to law enforcement raid (in
red), or any other reason (in black). Values are calculated using a time window of one week.
User migration
The observation that dark markets are resilient to closure suggests that users may move to other markets
[13,35]. We refer to this phenomenon as migration. In fact, migration was observed [36] after the closure
of the AlphaBay market when other markets, namely Hansa Market and Dream market, experienced an
abnormal spike in activity. In this section, we provide the first systematic investigation of dark market
users migration, by studying the effects of multiple closures. We identify migrant users in the following
way. For each market that was shut down, we identify users who started trading with another coexisting
market following the closure. Thus, users who were already trading on multiple markets before closure
are not considered migrants. Figure 4 shows the flows of migrant users between markets. The overall
picture reveals a common behaviour across all closures since after each closure there is a flow of migrants
to other coexisting markets.
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Figure 4: Migration of users following a dark market closure. Flows of users migrating to another
coexisting market following a closure. The arrowhead points to the direction of migration, and the width
of the arrow represent the number of users. Markets are ordered clockwise according to the closing date
in ascending order starting from Silk Road Marketplace.
An important question is which fraction of users involved in illicit trading continue to exchange with
dark markets following a closure. The answer needs to consider that a large number of users interact
only once across their life time. For example, a study based on data up to 2013 found that most of the
minted Bitcoins were accumulated in addresses which never sent [19]. In our dataset ∼ 38% of the users
interacted only once. To identify users who stop trading with dark markets due to a market closure, we
compute the fraction of “returning users” over time, meaning the fraction of all users active in a given
week that are active also in the following week. After computing the fraction of returning users over
time, we normalise it by the fraction of returning users at the time of closure (so that the normalised
value of returning at that day is 1). Then, we consider the median across market closures. We find that,
5 days after the closure of a dark market, only 85% of the expected number of returning users interacts
to another market. This result indicates that the closure does have an effect, albeit the vast majority of
users seems to behave as normal (from the point of view of the following interaction).
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Who is migrating?
The observation that some users stop trading following a dark market closure but the total volume traded
in dark markets does not decrease could indicate that migrant users are on average more active than
others.
We test this hypothesis by computing the activity of migrant users before and after closure. We
refer to the first dark market a user was interacting with as its home market. For all users (migrant
and non-migrant), we measure the total volume exchanged with any other user in our dataset including
the home market. We find that the median volume exchanged by migrant users is ∼ 10times larger
than the volume exchanged by non-migrant users (see Figure 5A), with the median volume exchanged
summing to 3882.9 USD for migrant users and to 387.2 USD for non-migrant users. The mean on
the other hand is 716441.9 USD and 17529.7 USD for migrant and non-migrant users respectively (see
Appendix 1.1 for the spending distribution of migrant and non-migrants). Similar conclusions can be
drawn by considering the volume exchanged with the home market only, which has median value of 263
USD and for non-migrant users and 74.3 USD for migrant users and a mean value of 2725.1 USD and
475.9 USD for migrant and non-migrant users respectively (see Figure 5B).
The activity distribution of migrants is significantly different from the non-migrant users’ distribution
(using Kolmogorov–Smirnov test, p < 0.01, see Table 3 in Appendix 1.1).
Figure 5: Migrants are more active than other users. (A) Total volume exchanged by migrant
users (orange box-plots) and non-migrant users (blue box-plots) before the closure of their home market.
(B) Volume exchanged by migrant users (orange box-plots) and non-migrant users (blue box-plots) with
their home market. The horizontal line in each box represents the median. The lower box boundary
shows the first quartile, and the upper one shows the third quartile. The whiskers show the minimum
and maximum values within the 1.5 lower and upper interquartile range.
Coordination in the dark
In our dataset, in all cases but one, users could choose between at least two surviving markets when
their home market closed. A natural question is therefore how migrant users decide where to migrate.
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In Figure 6, we show the evolution of the trading volume shares of the shut down market and the
top two destination markets in the periods preceding and following a closure. We find that the top two
destination markets experience an increase in share starting 2 days after the closure, and saturating after
about 6 days to around 27%.
Figure 6: Migration decision and impact. (A) The median share (across closures) of a closed
market (blue market), the top destination market for the migrant users (orange line) and the second top
destination for migrant users (green line). The shaded area represents the 50% interquartile range. Value
are computed using a rolling window of one week. Figures B-D show the probability of a market to be
chosen for migration given its rank at the time of coexisting market closure in comparison to the random
model. Markets are ranked in descending order according to (B) the number of overlapping users they
have with the closed market excluding Russian markets (C) the total trading volume in USD and (D)
the total trading volume in USD excluding Russian markets from the ranking. The random model in
the figures B-D represent a model where users can move to any existent market with equal probability.
We investigate the characteristics of the first destination market for migrant users, by ranking coexist-
ing markets according to the total trading volume in USD at the time of closure and the total number of
common users between the shut down and the coexisting market before closure. We find that, regardless
of the reason behind closure, users do not migrate randomly and chose to move to the market with the
highest trading volume which, in some cases, is also the market with the highest number of common
users.
Focusing on the first week after closure, we find that, on average, one market absorbs 66.1% ± 16.1
of all migrant users. Only 4% of the users migrate to more than one coexisting market simultaneously
after the closure. What is this market? Figure 6A shows that, in 36.4% of the closures considered, it
is the one sharing the larger number of common users with the closed market, while the chances that
users select the second and the third rank is 31.8%. Users do not choose to migrate to markets with
rank lower than the third.
Figure 6B shows that, when markets are ranked according to the volume of their transactions, the
second-largest is preferred in the majority of cases (31.8%). However, a closer look at the data reveals
that the Russian market occupies often the top ranks in terms of volume but it tends not to be the
preferred migration harbour, probably due language and geographical barriers. Excluding the Russian
market from the ranking, in fact, we find that the largest market is selected 41% of the times (see Figure
9
6C).
We compare the users’ decisions with a null random model, where at each closure users move with
equal probability to any of the existent markets. The random probability P of rank i to be chosen for
migration after m closures is equal to
Pi =
∑m
j=1 1/cj
m
,
where cj is the number of coexisting markets at the time of closure j. We find that the results of
the random procedure are significantly different from actual data, confirm the existence of a strong
coordination between users (see Figure 6)
Conclusion
Considering a novel dataset of Bitcoin transactions for 31 large dark markets and their users, we in-
vestigated how the darknet market ecosystem is affected by the unexpected closure of a market in the
period between 2013 and 2019. The markets under study differed in speciality, language, and date of
creation, and 24 of them were closed abruptly due to reasons including police raids and scams. We
found that the total volume traded on dark markets drops only temporarily following a dark market
closure, revealing that the ecosystem exhibits a remarkable resilience. We identified the origin of this
resilience, by focusing on individual users, and unveiled a swift and ubiquitous phenomenon of migration
between recently closed markets and other coexisting ones. We found that migrants are more active in
terms of total transaction volume compared to users who do not migrate, that they tend to privilege the
same unique market as destination and that this is generally the biggest market in terms of the total
trading volume. Our findings shed new light on the consequences of sudden closure and/or police raids
on dark market, which had been previously raised in the literature and among law enforcement enti-
ties [9,13,30]. Interesting future research directions include the role of market closure on the emergence
of new markets, refining the analysis to investigate whether scam closures and police raids may have
so-far neglected effects on user migration, and broaden the research to include the effect of online forums
on the performance of existing markets as well as on the migration choices after a closure [33].
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1 Appendix
1.1 Clustering techniques
In Bitcoin, multiple addresses can belong to one user; grouping these addresses reduces the complexity
of the ledger and Bitcoin anonymity [19]. Clustering techniques rely on how Bitcoin’s protocol works,
users behaviour on the blockchain, Bitcoin’s transaction graph structure and finally, machine learning.
Methods relying on Bitcoin’s protocol specifically exploit what is known as change addresses: Bitcoins
available in an address have to be spent as a whole. Figure 7 shows an example of a change address. User
A’s wallet has two addresses, one contains 1BTC and another has 2BTC. User A would like to transfer
0.25BTC to user B, as shown in Figure 7A. After transferring the 0.25BTC to B, the change (0.75BTC)
will not stay in the same address. Bitcoin protocol will create another address, also assigned to A, where
the 0.75BTC change will be stored. By observing this pattern, a heuristic technique proposed in [27]
suggests that these addresses can be grouped, as they belong to one user.
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Figure 7: How Bitcoin’s protocol handles transactions with change. (A) A transaction between
users A and user B, where A wants to transfer 0.25 Bitcoins to B. User A has two addresses, one with
1 Bitcoin and the other with 2 Bitcoins. User B has one address, containing 1 Bitcoin. (B) How a
transaction is conducted under Bitcoin protocol. User A first address transfers 0.25 Bitcoin to user B
first address. The change of 0.75 Bitcoin does not stay in User A first address 1, but appears, instead,
as another transaction to a new address. The dotted boundaries in both figures represent a grouping of
these addresses, as they belong to one user. A solid arrow represents an executed Bitcoin transaction,
while the dotted arrow represents a desired transaction.
Since users can have multiple addresses, they can use multiple of these addresses to transfer Bitcoins
in a single transaction. For example, Figure 8A shows a case where user A controls 3 different addresses.
Each address has a different amount of Bitcoins, 1, 4 and 2.5 respectively. User A wants to transfer 5
Bitcoins to user B, and two addresses will be used to complete the transaction as shown in Figure 8B.
This observation allows the grouping of these two addresses as a single user [27].
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Figure 8: Sending from multiple inputs in Bitcoin (A) A desired transaction between users A and
B, where A wants to send 5 Bitcoins to user B. User A has 3 different addresses with 1, 4 and 2.5
Bitcoins respectively. User B has one address containing 1 Bitcoin. (B) How the transaction will be
conducted under the Bitcoin protocol. User A will use two addresses to complete the transaction. Both
addresses will send to one address belonging to user B. The dotted boundaries in both figures represent
a grouping of these addresses as they belong to one user. The solid arrows represent an already executed
Bitcoin transaction while the dotted arrow represents a desired transaction.
The work in [21] challenged these heuristics, showing the possibility of having false positives and not
taking into consideration changes in the protocol. The work suggests instead a manual process, where
the behaviour of each entity is investigated. Page rank (network centrality measure [37]) was also used
to identify important addresses [38]; however, the addresses were already grouped using the heuristics
introduced by [27]. Machine learning was also shown to identify addresses which should be grouped as
one with 77% accuracy.
Mapping addresses to an actual identity is more challenging. Some entities already publish their
public key for donation and payment, such as Wikimedia Foundation [39]. The only research that
introduced a method for mapping a collection of addresses to a real-world identity is [21], through direct
interaction with the address. In this work, researchers directly engaged in 344 transactions with different
services including mining pools, exchanges, dark markets and gambling websites.
The introduction of these heuristics did not only challenge Bitcoin’s anonymity but also eased the
regulation of Bitcoin. Companies specialising in blockchain analytics started to capitalise on these
heuristics and provide tools for exchanges and law enforcement entities to facilitate regulatory efforts.
For our analysis of dark markets, our data was provided by Chainalysis [40], which is a blockchain
analytics company. Chainalysis aided several investigations led by different law enforcement entities,
including the United States Internal Revenue Service (IRS) [29].
Our dataset sampling approach (from the entire Bitcoin transactions) deploys a complex network
perspective. Transactions on the blockchain can be modelled as a directed weighted graph where a node
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represents a user, and a directed edge between two nodes A and B represents a transaction from user A to
user B. Depending on the clustering algorithm, a node can represent one address or multiple addresses.
A node can also be labelled as a specific entity or unlabelled (unnamed). Figure 9 shows a sketch of
the network and the different possible meanings of a node. For example in Figure 9, the black unnamed
node on the right side is a representation of two different addresses clustered together, however, they
were not attributed to an entity thus remained unnamed.
Figure 9: A dark market’s Bitcoin transaction network. A schematic representation of our dataset
as a complex network. Nodes represent users, and a direct edge between two nodes represents a trans-
action in the direction of the edge. Nodes can represent different abstractions as shown by the dotted
rhombus. Starting from the right side, the unnamed black node represents a cluster of two different
addresses which, however, was not attributed to a specific entity. The dark market node(in dark red,
Silk Road Market), is a representation of 3 addresses and attributed by the algorithm to the market.
The black named node on the left side of Silk Road Market node is a representation of 4 addresses and
named to belong to a specific entity. Finally, the black unnamed node at the bottom left side of the
figure, represents one address.
Dark markets information
In this section we provide data on each market understudy. Table 1 shows general information on the
dark markets included in our dataset.
Table 2 show each market total sent and received amount in USD and the number of users sent and
received to/from the dark market.
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Name Start date End date Closure reason Sales
Abraxas Market 2014− 12− 13 2015− 11− 05 scam drugs
Acropolis Market 2016− 03− 27 2017− 07− 01 voluntary mixed
Agora Market 2013− 12− 03 2015− 08− 26 voluntary mixed
AlphaBay Market 2014− 12− 22 2017− 07− 05 raided mixed
Apollon Market 2018− 05− 03 active active drugs
Babylon Market 2014− 07− 11 2015− 07− 31 raided drugs
Berlusconi Market 2018− 08− 12 active active mixed
Bilzerian24.net 2017− 11− 13 active active credits
Black Bank Market 2014− 02− 05 2015− 05− 18 scam mixed
Blue Sky Marketplace 2013− 12− 03 2014− 11− 05 raided drugs
Dream Market 2016− 03− 19 2019− 04− 30 voluntary mixed
East India Company Market 2015− 04− 28 2016− 01− 01 scam drugs
Empire Market 2018− 02− 01 active active mixed
Evolution Market 2014− 01− 14 2015− 03− 14 scam drugs
German Plaza Market 2015− 05− 22 2016− 05− 01 scam mixed
Hansa Market 2014− 03− 09 2017− 07− 20 raided drugs
House of Lions Market 2016− 05− 23 2017− 07− 12 raided drugs
Hydra Marketplace 2015− 11− 25 active active mixed
Middle Earth Marketplace 2014− 06− 22 2015− 11− 04 scam mixed
Nucleus Market 2014− 10− 24 2016− 04− 13 scam mixed
Olympus Market 2018− 04− 20 2018− 09− 04 scam mixed
Oxygen Market 2015− 04− 16 2015− 08− 27 scam drugs
Pandora OpenMarket 2013− 10− 20 2014− 11− 05 raided drugs
Russian Anonymous Marketplace 2014− 08− 29 2017− 09− 21 raided mixed
Sheep Marketplace 2013− 02− 28 2013− 11− 29 scam drugs
Silk Road Marketplace 2011− 01− 31 2013− 10− 02 raided mixed
Silk Road 2 Market 2013− 11− 06 2014− 11− 05 raided mixed
Silk Road 3.1 2018− 01− 21 active active drugs
TradeRoute Market 2016− 11− 06 2017− 10− 12 scam mixed
Unicc 2015− 01− 30 active active credits
Wall Street Market 2016− 09− 09 2019− 05− 02 raided mixed
Table 1: Dark markets information. Information on the 31 selected dark markets included in our
dataset. For each market, the table states the name of the market, the start and end dates of its operation,
the closure reason (if applicable) and the type of products sold by the market. “Drugs” indicates that
the primary products sold on the market are drugs while “credits” indicates the market specializes in
fake IDs and credit cards and “mixed” indicates the market sells both types of products
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Name Volume sent
(USD)
Volume received
(USD)
out
degree
in
degree
Volume
tot(USD)
Abraxas Market 29, 822, 178.9 23, 044, 463.2 21953 96612 52, 866, 642.1
Acropolis Market 11, 196.7 11, 407.6 101 201 22, 604.3
Agora Market 163, 946, 119.7 148, 224, 155.3 122582 468708 312, 170, 3
AlphaBay Market 605, 445, 951.5 529, 077, 6 267818 1590672 1, 134, 523, 565.2
Apollon Market 17, 384.5 15, 113.6 57 138 32, 498.1
Babylon Market 144, 292.6 149, 257.5 902 1398 293, 550.1
Berlusconi Market 230, 036.6 239, 430.9 514 2153 469, 467.5
Bilzerian24.net 22, 821, 289.6 19, 130, 767.5 108 240232 41, 952, 057.1
Black Bank Market 14, 841, 938.8 13, 858, 325.9 15805 53260 28, 700, 264.8
Blue Sky Marketplace 4, 294, 944.4 3, 297, 912.5 10210 16275 7, 592, 856.9
Dream Market 78, 031, 896.0 60, 049, 434.3 46648 475260 138, 081, 330.3
East India Company Market 3, 638, 096.5 2, 942, 049.9 4630 1951 6, 580, 146.4
Empire Market 11, 962, 986.2 8, 975, 257.2 1309 66124 20, 938, 243.4
Evolution Market 55, 982, 302.9 49, 622, 433.1 35415 219491 105, 604, 735.9
German Plaza Market 1, 032, 802.5 951, 757.3 22 10824 1, 984, 559.9
Hansa Market 62, 087, 671.5 61, 171, 541 73496 336045 123, 259, 212.5
House of Lions Market 705.7 1, 018.4 12 97 1, 724.1
Hydra Marketplace 426, 946, 433.7 474, 549, 308.6 113878 1081883 901, 495, 742.3
Middle Earth Marketplace 9, 861, 173.8 8, 549, 901.3 9503 38506 18, 411, 075
Nucleus Market 70, 112, 730.6 58, 544, 889.4 55522 207791 128, 657, 619.9
Olympus Market 828, 076.9 711, 202.93 1877 4230 1, 539, 279.9
Oxygen Market 42, 914.2 37, 273.5 278 605 80, 187.7
Pandora OpenMarket 9, 422, 325.0 8, 568, 086.9 8864 35859 17, 990, 411.9
Russian Anonymous Marketpl. 131, 000, 457.9 105, 804, 257.1 36794 745939 236, 804, 714.9
Sheep Marketplace 15, 624, 992.4 11, 624, 434.9 7718 38612 27, 249, 427.4
Silk Road 2 Market 85, 610, 718.5 70, 325, 928.9 48293 227239 155, 936, 647.4
Silk Road 3.1 13, 310, 738.1 9, 547, 696.8 15574 64205 22, 858, 434.9
Silk Road Marketplace 172, 812, 766.4 140, 579, 172.6 73114 400079 313, 391, 938.9
TradeRoute Market 18, 313, 990.6 17, 190, 084.7 14318 104413 35, 504, 075.3
Unicc 147, 418, 817.2 106, 581, 024.9 443 1301371 253, 999, 842.1
Wall Street Market 68, 596, 630.4 52, 623, 050.2 26522 359656 121, 219, 680.6
Table 2: Dark markets overall activity. The activity of the dark markets as observed in our dataset.
For each market, the table reports the total volume sent and received by dark market addresses. It also
reports the total number of users who sent (in-degree) and received (out-degree) Bitcoins to/from dark
market addresses.
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Moving Average Convergence Divergence Analysis
To further quantify the changes in dark markets traded volume, we calculate the Moving Average Con-
vergence Divergence (MACD) of the weekly trading volume. The MACD is an trading indicator used in
stock markets to quantify price movements and fluctuations. It is composed of three time series. Firstly,
the MACD, calculated as the difference between the exponential weighted moving average of the trading
volume for a period of 12 weeks and the exponential weighted moving average of the trading volume for
a period of 26 weeks. Secondly, the signal line, computed as the 9 weeks exponential weighted moving
average of the MACD time series. Finally, the last time series, known as the histogram, representing the
difference between the MACD and the signal line.
Figure 10 shows the indicator behaviour across time. For each closure, there is a fluctuation in the
MACD line and the histogram line indicates a downward change in the overall dark markets volume.
However, an upward change can be observed after the closures indicating that dark markets recover.
Figure 10: Moving Average Convergence Divergence (MACD) (A) The MACD (blue line) and
MACD signal line (orange line) for dark markets trading volume from 2013 till 2016. (B) The MACD
histogram (blue line) for the dark markets trading volume from 2013 to the end of 2016. (C) The MACD
(blue line) and MACD (orange line) signal line for dark markets trading volume from 2017 until July,
2019. (D) The MACD histogram (blue line) for the dark markets trading volume from 2017 until July,
2019. Vertical dashed lines represent markets closure.
Migrant and non migrants
In the main text we show that for each closed market, migrant users are more active in terms of the
total amount they send and received overall, specifically with the closed dark market. In this section,
we show the distribution of the migrants and non-migrants activity across all dark markets. Figure 11
shows that activity for migrants overall is higher than the non-migrants.
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Figure 11: Migrant vs. non-migrants activity distribution The distribution of the total volume
sent and received across all closed dark markets for migrants (orange line) and non migrants (blue line).
Table 3 shows the results of a Kolmogorov smirnov test between the migrant and non migrant activity
distribution.
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Dark market p-value (dark market transactions) p-value (all transactions)
Abraxas Market 5.9 ∗ 10−85 9.5673 ∗ 10243
Agora Market 0 0
AlphaBay Market 0 0
Babylon Market 3.794 ∗ 10−04 8.161 ∗ 10−17
Black Bank Market 1.632283 ∗ 10−42 1.735524 ∗ 10−159
Blue Sky Marketplace 1.138519 ∗ 10−22 6.731465 ∗ 10−67
Dream Market 7.749932 ∗ 10−19 1.204320e− 66
Evolution Market 0 0
German Plaza Market 9.276236 ∗ 10−18 1.049758 ∗ 10−44
Hansa Market 4.727538 ∗ 10−159 0
Middle Earth Marketplace 9.356239 ∗ 10−20 2.203038 ∗ 10−83
Nucleus Market 2.538463 ∗ 10−174 6.319438∗−268
Olympus Market 1.453169 ∗ 10−03 1.647657 ∗ 10−22
Pandora OpenMarket 5.903384 ∗ 10−65 1.622666 ∗ 10−187
Russian Anonymous Market-
place
3.544511 ∗ 10−83 1.673279 ∗ 10−48
Sheep Marketplace 4.899846 ∗ 10−112 2.234014 ∗ 10−231
Silk Road 2 Market 0 0
Silk Road Marketplace 0 0
TradeRoute Market 1.563685 ∗ 10−63 3.078314 ∗ 10−166
Wall Street Market 8.111283 ∗ 10−56 1.109606 ∗ 10−123
Table 3: P values between the migrants and stayers The table shows the p value results from the
Kolmogorov smirnov test between the migrant and non migrants users distributions. The table report
the results for the transactions to/from dark markets and the results for all the transactions.
21
